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Lessons from the Past:  
The Rapid Clearance of 
Denmark’s Minefields in 1945
by Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] 
T
he clearance of the vast majority 
of Denmark’s minefields during 
1945 was remarkable. In just un-
der five months, a force ranging between 
750 and 2,600 German prisoners of war 
(POW) under the supervision of 250–350 
Danish officers and noncommissioned 
officers cleared 1,389,281 mines from an 
area of 1,103.2 sq km (425.9 sq mi).1 Such 
speed of clearance stands in stark con-
trast with much of modern humanitar-
ian mine action since the 1990s. This 
article will explain how such speed was 
possible and why it could not reasonably 
be repeated today. The article will also 
identify a number of important lessons 
that remain to be learned.
Between 1943 and 1945, German forc-
es in Denmark emplaced approximately 
1,401,946 anti-personnel and anti-tank 
mines, mostly on beaches suitable for 
amphibious landing, but also around 
key facilities such as radar stations.2 On 
4 May 1945 at Lüneburg Heath, east of 
Hamburg, the Allies accepted the un-
conditional surrender of the German 
forces in Denmark, along with those 
in the Netherlands and northwest 
Germany. Item 3 of the Instrument of 
Surrender stipulated that “the German 
command is to carry out at once, and 
without argument or comment, all fur-
ther orders that will be issued by the 
Allied Powers on any subject.”3 On this 
basis an initial force of 1,000 German 
Image 1. Order of General R.H. Dewing  
confirming the establishment of 
Minekommando Dänemark. 
Image courtesy of Vardemuseerne.
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POWs, mostly Pioneer troops, were required 
to conduct clearance within Denmark. To bet-
ter allow for the provisions of the 1929 Geneva 
Convention, the Germans were officially cate-
gorized as Surrendered Enemy Personnel rath-
er than POWs. The other 200,000 odd German 
troops in Denmark returned to Germany in the 
weeks following the surrender.
Clearance started quickly and proceeded 
quickly. On 11 May 1945, within one week of 
the unconditional surrender, the first clear-
ance tasks had begun.4 This arrangement was 
formalized on 18 June 1945 with the found-
ing of Minekommando Dänemark by order of 
General Dewing, commander of the British 
forces in Denmark. The initial contingent of 
1,000 Pioneer soldiers had fallen to 750 in six 
weeks, most likely at least in part due to acci-
dents; the June order increased the group to 
1,892 officers and men.5 By August 1945 the 
Image 2. A Sd.Kfz. 251 (Sonderkraftfahrzeug 251) halftrack alongside members of Minekommando Dänemark erecting a minefield 
fence, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. Excellent minefields records for the vast majority of minefields enabled accurate mark-
ing and fencing of dangerous areas and their rapid clearance in the summer of 1945.
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.
Image 3. Members of Minekommando Dänemark prodding for mines, Jutland Denmark, summer 1945. Prodding was often the main 
method of detection in Minekommando Dänemark, and this was probably linked to the high casualty rate. Today prodding is used 
as an aid excavation and is rarely deemed suitable as a primary means of detection. Note how close the deminers, without any 
PPE, are to each other. Today basic safety distances, site marking, and wearing of PPE would be enforced as a matter of routine. 
Mapham, James (Sergeant), No. 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit.
Image courtesy of WAR OFFICE SECOND WORLD WAR OFFICIAL COLLECTION, IWM. 
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number grew to 2,600.6 Two-thirds of the personnel were di-
rectly employed in the field, while the remainder fulfilled staff 
functions. The organization of the clearance is worth not-
ing. The British had overall command of the demining ef-
fort from the old German headquarters on Rådhuspladsen in 
Copenhagen. Major Stanley Holland, Royal Artillery, was the 
officer in charge. Supervision would be conducted by a cad-
re of about 250–350 Danish officers and men within an or-
ganization known as Dansk Minekontrol, headed by Kaptajn 
D.A.Wieth-Knudsen.7 Working for both was the head of 
German Minekommando Dänemark, Hauptmann Geuer, for-
mally Head of the Wehrmacht Pioneer School in Horsens.8,9 
The Dewing order of 18 June 1945 was explicit on a number 
of points. First, “the execution of the work is completely left to 
the Germans themselves - they can use which methods they 
wish to take up the mines provided all security measures for 
the protection of civilians and property are observed. At each 
Minefield where mining takes place, at least one Danish sol-
dier must be in control and he is responsible for compliance 
with all regulations and rules.”10 Second, Minenkommando 
were to “complete the demining in Denmark at the shortest 
possible time.”11
The Germans used a number of methods to remove mines. 
Many of these would be deemed dangerous today. Safety dis-
tances between deminers were not observed in a way recogniz-
able now. Prodding for mines in groups without any personal 
protective equipment was routine, whereas it now only tends 
be used as a secondary aid to excavation rather than a primary 
detection technique. Prodding was also done using long prod-
ders when searching for anti-tank mines.12 
British Number 3 mine detectors were also available to 
search for metallic anti-tank mines, most commonly one of 
four versions of the Tellermine. For anti-tank mines 
that were not easily detected, such as the Holzmine, 
only long prodders could be used. A breakdown of 
the 1,389,281 mines cleared between 11 May and 31 
September 1945 can be found in Table 1. 
Sometimes highly detailed clearance statistics were 
collected and recorded. Mines removed from a pan-
el (i.e., a grouping or block of mine rows) would be 
marked as missing or booby-trapped. The same preci-
sion involved in creating the excellent minefield records 
was often repeated in the maintenance of clearance re-
cords.15 At a national level the number of mines found 
per day was recorded (see Table 1). Even today, many 
countries could not give a similar breakdown of the 
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) cleared, 
despite the huge advances in information technology. 
With pen, paper, and typewriters, better basic statistics were 
available over seventy years ago than is sometimes the case 
currently at national and even program level today.
Minekommando Dänemark also innovated in terms of the 
use of mechanical assets. A number of Panzer III tanks, StuG 
III assault guns, and Sd.Kfz. 251 halftracks, often in bad con-
dition, were co-opted into service. Typically these would be 
used as some form of verification asset after clearance in a 
form of quality control known at the time as “test runs.” Two 
types of test runs were devised: an anti-tank minefield run 
and an anti-personnel and anti-tank minefield run. Unlike 
most modern mine verification vehicles, rollers were fitted to 
the rear of the tanks. Initially rollers were made of concrete, 
Image 4. Still frame from the 1945 film Livsfare Miner showing mem-
bers of Minekommando Dänemark prodding from a standing position 
for anti-tank mines, Jutland 1945. 
Image courtesy of the Danish Film Institute.13
Type of 
Mine Model of Mine
Number 
Cleared - 
Type
Number 
Cleared - 
Model
AT Mine 452,819
Teller Mines 326,407
Riegelmine 16,519
Holzmine 85,435
Pansermine Danemark 24,458
AP Mine 936,462
S-Mine 188,835
Schützenmine 311,334
Stockmine 213,338
Schutzenmine Dane-
mak og berger (locally 
made Schu Mines)
222,955
TOTAL 1,389,281 1,389,281
Table 1. Table showing breakdown of mines cleared in Denmark 
11 May–31 September 1945.14 
Table courtesy of author.
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Image 5. Members of Minekommando Dänemark erecting a minefield fence, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. A bunker can just be 
made out on the sand dune behind the second figure from the right. As elsewhere on the Atlantic Wall, the minefields emplaced by 
the Germans were integrated into a wider defensive system and would often be covered by fire from a hardened shelter. 
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.
Image 6. Members of Minekommando Dänemark pose on the front of a Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault gun, Jutland, summer 
1945. The Stug III was one of a number of armored vehicles used to tow rollers. 
Image courtesy of the Danish Coastal Authority.
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Image 7. Members of Minekommando Dänemark pose with a number of Stockmine 43s and three Tellermine 42s cleared from a 
nearby minefield, Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945.
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.
Image 8. Members of Minekommando Dänemark walking the ground they have cleared in Jutland, Denmark, summer 1945. The 
practice of marching in close order over land to prove it was clear was widespread in the post-war years throughout Europe. Often 
the local population would be invited to observe in order to reassure them that their land was clear. While it appears callous, an 
equivalent does occur today—sometimes a clearance organization will play football on land cleared to reassure the local popula-
tion. Mapham, James (Sergeant), No. 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit. 
Image courtesy of WAR OFFICE SECOND WORLD WAR OFFICIAL COLLECTION, IWM.
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Image 9 (top). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing cleared Tellermine 42s defused and awaiting trans-
port to a demolition site. Often more mines were cleared daily in Denmark in 1945 than are cleared yearly in a number of coun-
tries today. 
Image 10 (middle). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing a character prodding for mines. Today if mines 
are hard to detect due to having minimum metal content or are in ground with heavy metal contamination, the deminer will usu-
ally employ full excavation within their lane rather than prodding. 
Image 11 (bottom). Still from the 2015 Danish-German film Land of Mine, showing the terrain of the Juntland coast.
All images this page courtesy of Camilla Hjelm.
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but these disintegrated too easily during repeated test runs. 
Concrete was replaced by steel and concrete rollers especial-
ly made at the Varde Steelworks. Fifteen vehicles are record-
ed as initiating mines with their tracks during test runs.18 
Panzer IIIs and StuG IIIs mainly only lost a track and a 
wheel. Unfortunate drivers typically experienced hearing 
damage. Examples of the patterns driven in test runs can be 
seen in Images 17 and 18.
The clearance of Denmark was costly, as was recognized 
at the time. In December 1945, Dansk Minekrontrol listed 
149 dead, 165 severely injured, and 167 lightly injured dur-
ing the demining effort.20 While the total workforce was not 
static, Dansk Minekrontrol calculated that 20 percent of all 
deminers were either killed or injured. Dansk Minekrontrol 
were keen to point out that the statistic of 100 deminers 
killed and 240 injured for every million mines removed 
in Denmark compared favorably to France, where it was 
claimed that 1,000 deminers were killed and 1,000 were in-
jured for every million mines cleared.21 
Demining was and is dangerous. In the 1940s, demining 
techniques were in their infancy. The casualties among al-
lied military deminers were also very high.22 In 1949, the 
Geneva Conventions were updated. A revised Article 52 stat-
ed that “Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be 
employed on labour which is of an unhealthy or dangerous 
nature. The removal of mines or similar devices shall be con-
sidered as dangerous labour.”23
The post-war clearance of Europe as a whole was undoubt-
edly quick, both by the standards of the day and historically. 
While hard to prove categorically, the 1945 Denmark clear-
ance operation was probably amongst the fastest ever under-
taken. On average in Denmark in the summer of 1945, 9,715 
mines were cleared daily. By way of comparison to Denmark’s 
1,389,281 mines cleared from an area of over 1,103.2 sq km 
(425.9 sq mi) by a force ranging between 750 and 2,600 
German POWs, in the Netherlands between 20 May and 31 
December 1945, the Draeger Brigade of up to 3,688 personnel 
cleared 1,079,857 landmines.24 The scale and speed of both ef-
forts in Denmark and Holland are perhaps dwarfed by those 
in France, where from 1945 to 1947, 48,000 German POWs 
and 3,000 French deminers cleared 13 million mines at a cost 
of 1,709 killed and 3,000 injured.25
In November 2004, during a speech in Nairobi, a senior 
mine action figure compared the European efforts in the 
Image 12. Dansk Minekrontrol graph showing the number of mines cleared daily in Denmark 11 May–31 September 1945. A conser-
vative estimate of mines cleared versus working days gives an average of 9,715 mines cleared a day. Such daily clearance totals are 
remarkable and are rarely if ever repeated today.  
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.16
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Image 13. Dansk Minekrontrol map showing the general locations of 1,389,281 mines cleared in Denmark 11 May–31 September 1945. 
On each line the figure above indicates anti-tank mines, the figure below indicates anti-personnel mines. 
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen, Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.17
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1940s directly to the slowness of modern clearance opera-
tions.26 Was this a fair comparison? The answer is yes and no. 
Yes in that modern clearance efforts are not as efficient as they 
could be. But no in that it is not practical to repeat much of 
the 1940s approach in the modern context. How much speed 
of clearance in Denmark contributed to high casualty figures 
remains debated to this day.27 Acceptance of casualties can be 
argued to be a contributory factor in the rapid clearance but 
it was by no means the only factor or necessarily the key one.
The main reason why Denmark and other countries could be 
cleared so fast was simple: the operators knew where the mines 
were.28 The Germans kept excellent records of the vast ma-
jority of their minefields. Wehrmacht draftsmen were highly 
skilled and made very accurate mine-
field maps. This was nothing short of es-
sential for rapid minefield clearance. A 
good example of such minefield records 
can be seen at Kirkehöje R.V.St. near 
Paarup in central Denmark. Between 
26 July and 7 August 1944, a minefield 
of 5,983 Schützenminen was emplaced 
around the Luftwaffe Directional Radio 
Relay finding station. Obergefreiter 
Busse produced the minefield record, 
reproduced in Image 14, and the pan-
el record reproduced in Image 22. The 
high level of detail and precision was 
common in German minefield records 
across Europe. This level of detail in-
cluded the location of each panel and 
the number of Schützenminen it con-
tained as well as the panel plan show-
ing which mines were booby-trapped 
and which mines were left out of the 
pattern. Such detail would be envied 
by many modern clearance operators, 
even those clearing pattern minefields 
with reasonable minefield records in lo-
cations such as Turkey and the Falkland 
Islands/Malvinas. The principle prob-
lem of modern mine clearance, “where 
are the mines?” did not really exist in 
Denmark in 1945.
In many mine-affected countries in 
Europe, much of life today carries on 
as if there had never been minefields. 
The town of Esbjerg on the east coast of 
Jutland, very near to the Skallingen pen-
insula, illustrates this point. The town was heavily fortified by 
the Germans from 1943 onwards on both the seaward and land-
ward side since any allied landing in the area would have needed 
to capture such a large port as soon as possible. Images 19 and 20 
show the overall minefield plan for Esbjerg. Anti-tank and anti-
personnel minefields were integrated to cover landward approach-
es along with various prepared demolitions in the port area. 
Esbjerg was cleared during the summer of 1945. Records 
detail 63,888 mines of all types being removed.29 Image 23 
shows Esbjerg as it is today, much expanded, with the for-
mer minefields superimposed onto housing estates, industri-
al sites, etc. As with other countries in Europe at the time, it 
was shown that the recovery from landmines could be rapid 
Image 15 and Image 16. Rollers attached to the back of Panzer IIIs and a StuG III assault 
gun used for quality control, Denmark 1945. 
Images courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen, Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.
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to a point where the legacy is barely remembered by the gen-
eral population decades later.
In December 1945, the Danes declared that 99 percent of 
the minefields in the country had been cleared—a remarkable 
achievement by any standard and one that deserves recognition 
despite the high human cost involved.30 Most mine clearance 
by German POWs appears to have finished in February 1946.31 
The only areas remaining to be cleared were in Skallingen. 
These minefields presented a particularly difficult challenge. 
“The remaining mines were laid in a random distribution 
and consisted of several types, including both anti-tank and 
anti-personnel mines.”32 The move-
ment of the sand presented fur-
ther problems. Even in 1945, mines 
that had been in the ground for one 
or two years could be found under 
1.5 m (1.6 yd) of sand.33 Movement 
of mines by the sea was also an is-
sue, just as it had been in the United 
Kingdom from 1940 onward.34 The 
records suggested around 72,000 
mines were laid at Skallingen of 
which 61,000 were cleared up to 
1947.35 Skallingen appears to be the 
one place where German minefield 
record keeping fell below the nor-
mal standard. It is also the one area 
that was not cleared in 1945. Since 
1947, a further 3,500 were cleared, 
and an estimated 2,500 were swept 
away, having been in an area eroded 
by the sea over time. From 2005 to 
2012, Denmark conducted the diffi-
cult and costly clearance of the last 
minefields believed to be in an area 
of 187,200 sq m (223,889.3 sq yd). A 
further 3,357 mines and 552 other 
items were destroyed.36
Summary
Debate will continue about the 
decision of the Allies to co-opt 
Surrendered Enemy Personnel to 
conduct mine clearance in the 1940s, 
especially given a recent film on the 
subject called Under sandet or Land 
of Mine in English. The demining 
techniques used then were far high-
er risk than those that would be acceptable now. The inabil-
ity to fully repeat this approach to some degree undermines 
direct comparisons with modern mine action. However, the 
key factor that allowed such rapid clearance, regardless of 
casualties, was the excellent minefield records kept by those 
who emplaced the minefields in the first place. In many parts 
of the world we unfortunately do not have the equivalent re-
cords that allow rapid identification of the actual contaminat-
ed ground and quick clearance.
It is clear that modern-day mine action still has much to 
learn from those who went before us, not least the importance 
Image 17 and Image 18. Test runs patterns for quality control of cleared anti-tank mine-
fields and anti-personnel minefields. 
Images courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.19
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Image 19 (left) and Image 20 (above). Original overall German minefield plan for the defence of Esbjerg. Any Allied land-
ing on the west coast of Denmark was unlikely due to difficulties in providing air cover. If such a landing had been attempt-
ed it would have required the capture of a port. Esbjerg was the second largest port in Denmark and the only viable option 
on the west coast of the country. For this reason the islands and spits on the seaward side, including Skallingen, were heav-
ily mined. On the landward side of Esbjerg and around the port itself, 63,888 mines of all types were removed in 1945. 
Images courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
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of field staff collecting sufficient and accurate data in order to 
better allow effective conduct of their operations and to bet-
ter address the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 obligations.37 The 
Germans and Danes collected better data with pen, paper, 
and typewriter in 1945 than many programs and national au-
thorities manage today with computers. We should aim to not 
only match them, but routinely surpass them. The introduc-
tion of IMSMA Core in coming years will hopefully aid im-
provements in relevant data collection and analysis. What is 
also needed is a change in working culture amongst more field 
staff so that they see accurate data collection and reporting as 
fundamental to their role.
What is indisputable is the bravery and sacrifice of those 
German deminers who, often very young, gave so much in the 
summer of 1945 in order to assist Denmark and other coun-
tries in Europe to begin the recovery from such a destructive 
conflict. I know of no memorial to these and the other POWs 
who died or were injured, in Denmark or in any other 
European country. Perhaps those who gave so much so that 
Image 22 (right). One of the panel layouts for Fink section of 
the Kirkehöje minefield. Most mines emplaced by the Germans 
would be recorded individually in a panel plan such as this. Red 
crosses indicated booby trapped Schutzenmines, blue where 
mines were deliberately not laid. Note that in this panel of 143 
mines, 19 Schutzenmines (13%) were booby trapped with anti-
lift devices.  
Image courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
Image 21. Damage caused by an anti-tank mine on the track of a Panzer III during a “Test Run” of a minefield, Jutland, Denmark, 
summer 1945. 
Image courtesy of Dan Mouritzsen – Silkeborg Bunkermuseum Denmark.
14
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol22/iss1/4
33ISSUE 22.1 @ APRIL 2018 
Roly Evans
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
Roly Evans is an Advisor in Land Release 
and Operational Efficiency in the Risk 
Management Division at the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD). He also covers training 
issues and conventional explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) including the 
Collaborative ORDnance data repository 
(CORD) and the GICHD Cluster Munitions Identification Tool (CMID). 
He has worked in the fields of survey, clearance, EOD, and physical 
security and stockpile management in Africa, Europe, the Middle 
East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. 
Image 23. Previous minefields cleared in 1945 superimposed on an expanded Esbjerg today. Red lines indicate anti tanks mine-
fields containing either Tellermines or Holzmines. Green lines indicate anti-personnel minefields containing either Schützminen, 
Stockmines or S-Mines. S-Mines were known to cause most casualties to both attacking troops and deminers.
Image courtesy of the Danish Engineer Regiment.
these minefields would no longer endanger civilians should be 
recognized, regardless of the regime they once served? 
The author wishes to sincerely thank the following with-
out whom this article would not have been possible. Major 
Peter Jegsen, Lance Corporal Preben Erichs, Dan Mouritzsen, 
Martin Jebens, John Jensen, and Antoon Meijers.
See endnotes page 61
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